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ABSTRACT 
  In 1987, the United States political and social systems lost trust in 
the judiciary and severely limited its authority by enacting the 
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. During this period, many 
judges were forced to impose sentences they viewed as unjust. Trust in 
the judiciary was restored in 2005, when United States v. Booker 
made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory. Despite the increase in 
judicial discretion, however, judges are still unable to correct 
sentences imposed during the intervening eighteen years because 
Booker does not apply retroactively. Unfortunately, the executive and 
legislative branches are similarly unable to provide adequate 
remedies. Congressional action is insufficient because it is inflexible, 
time consuming, and generally nonretroactive. Executive clemency 
appears more promising due to a flexible and broad nature that 
allows the president and state governors to pardon or commute 
sentences at will. But executives have become unwilling to use their 
clemency power, making it an inadequate remedy. This Note 
proposes a solution that overcomes the limitations of the current 
system: judicial recommendation of executive clemency. This solution 
produces three benefits. First, it provides judges with a discretionary 
tool to reduce disproportionate mandatory sentences. Second, it 
revitalizes the exercise of clemency by giving it additional legitimacy. 
Finally, it refocuses clemency grants on the defendant and the facts of 
the case rather than on political influences. This Note provides eight 
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illustrative criteria for judicial recommendation of executive clemency 
that, together, combine the characteristics of three modern cases in 
which the sentencing judges recommended clemency. This Note seeks 
to explain how and why each criterion might be important, taking into 
consideration the goals of judicial discretion, executive clemency, and 
the criminal justice system overall. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a society, we trust the judiciary to be a fair and objective 
arbiter of justice. Article III of the U.S. Constitution contains the 
clause “[t]he judicial Power of the United States[] shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish,” which establishes the federal 
judicial system.1 This vesting of power was unanimously approved at 
the Constitutional Convention in 1787.2 Not only is the judiciary 
independent from the other branches of government,3 but it is also 
entrusted with the authority to review congressional and presidential 
actions.4 Yet, for eighteen years prior to the Supreme Court’s 2005 
decision in United States v. Booker,5 the United States’ political and 
social systems lost trust in the judiciary and severely limited its 
authority by enacting the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(Sentencing Guidelines).6 During this period of “mandatory 
injustice,”7 many judges were forced to impose sentences they viewed 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
 2. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1966) (resolving in 1787 to establish a national judiciary). 
 3. To achieve independence of judgment, Article III of the Constitution gives federal 
judges life tenure, allowing them to “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and warrants 
that their compensation “not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST. 
art III, § 1. 
 4. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 5. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 6. The authority to establish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was provided by the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 7. While the eighteen years between the enactment of the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Booker decision may seem too narrow a focus to warrant serious 
consideration, a sample of federal justice statistics proves otherwise. In just the eleven years 
from 1993 to 2004, an estimated 502,228 individuals were sentenced to prison. See BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, Publications and Products: Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=4 (last revised May 5, 2010) (providing links to 
annual reports containing sentencing statistics). 
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as unjust: some were disproportionate to the severity of the crimes, 
and others were unequal as between codefendants. They found still 
others inconsistent as between defendants sentenced before and after 
the Guidelines became discretionary.8 
The restoration of trust in the judiciary began in 2005, when 
Booker made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory.9 Despite the 
increase in judicial discretion, however, judges are still unable to 
correct sentences imposed during the period of mandatory injustice 
because Booker does not apply retroactively.10 Furthermore, some 
state judges remain similarly bound by state-imposed mandatory 
minimum sentences or other inflexible statutes, which create the same 
mandatory-injustice situation as on the federal level.11 This Note 
therefore also addresses mandatory injustice at the state level. 
It may seem that the executive or legislative branches could 
remedy mandatory injustice. Congressional action, however, is 
insufficient because it is inflexible, time consuming, and generally 
nonretroactive.12 Executive clemency appears more promising on 
cursory examination: its flexible and broad nature allows the 
president and state governors to pardon or commute sentences at 
will, including those sentenced during the mandatory-injustice 
period.13 Indeed, prior to the Nixon era, executives regularly granted 
clemency. In recent years, however, clemency grants have declined 
rapidly at both the federal and state levels, coming nearly to a halt. 
This is a result of a combination of factors, including the 
unreviewable nature of clemency grants, the prevailing public belief 
that they represent abuses of power, the increasing popularity of 
retributivist theory as a justification for punishment, and the “tough 
on crime” political trend.14 Consequently, executives have become 
unwilling to use their clemency power, making it an inadequate 
 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. Current sentencing-reform efforts continue the restoration 
process. See, e.g., THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 30–73 (2008) 
(recommending a variety of sentencing reform policies); see also id. at 113–17 (recommending 
reforms to revitalize the executive pardon power). 
 10. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31 (2000) (requiring mandatory minimum sentences 
for drug offenses); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §333.7403 (2000 & West Supp. 2001) (same); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 60.04 (McKinney 2009) (same). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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solution to the problem of mandatory injustice. In the current state of 
the United States’ social, legal, and political systems, none of the 
three branches of government can alone correct the results of the 
period of mandatory injustice. 
This Note proposes a solution that overcomes the limitations of 
the current system to correct mandatory injustice: judicial 
recommendation of executive clemency. This solution produces three 
benefits. First, it provides judges with a discretionary tool to reduce 
disproportionate mandatory sentences. Second, it helps revitalize the 
exercise of clemency by giving it additional legitimacy. Finally, it 
helps to refocus clemency grants on the defendant and the facts of the 
case rather than on political influences. In essence, judicial 
recommendation of clemency advances the goals of judicial 
discretion, executive clemency, and the criminal justice system.15 
When mandatory sentencing schemes result in injustice that judges 
cannot correct acting alone, judicial recommendation of executive 
clemency is an effective discretionary tool that should be used readily. 
Part I lays out the nature of the problem. It describes the decline 
in judges’ discretion to formulate and modify sentences. In the early 
1800s, judges recommended pardons by writing directly to the 
president. Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
judges could modify sentences by invoking Rule 35 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.16 But in the eighteen years between the 
Guidelines’ enactment and Booker, judges lost their discretion in 
formulating or modifying sentences. In particular, Part I evaluates the 
opposition to mandatory Sentencing Guidelines expressed by judges 
in three cases,17 namely, United States v. Angelos,18 United States v. 
Harvey,19 and United States v. McDade.20 Part I argues that because 
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35. 
 17. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004), United States v. Harvey, 
946 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1991), and United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2009) 
are three of a very few cases, both within federal and state case law, in which judges 
recommended clemency. Other examples include United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23, 45–46 
(D.D.C. 1961), rev’d on other grounds, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc), and People v. 
White, 128 N.Y.S.2d 370, 375 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1953). Because of the lack of literature and study 
on judicial recommendation of executive clemency, one can only speculate about the reasons for 
such limited case law. Considering the declining exercise of clemency, it is not far-fetched to 
impute such a deficiency to the judiciary’s belief, and rightly so, that such recommendations 
would yield few results. 
 18. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004). 
 19. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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judges were required by law to impose disproportionate sentences 
during the mandatory-injustice period, defendants who were so 
sentenced have a genuine need for sentence reduction through a 
nonjudicial remedy. 
Part II points out the deficiencies of other solutions. Part II.A 
describes the practical obstacles of exclusive dependence on 
legislative reform, namely its lengthy process and adverseness to 
retroactivity. Part II.B first outlines the legal foundation and 
procedures of executive clemency and discusses the benefits of 
executive clemency to the criminal justice system. Part II.C then 
argues that, despite such benefits, waiting for executive action as a 
sole means of alleviating the effects of unjust sentences is inadequate 
because of clemency’s current stigma. 
Part III ties together the discussions in Parts I and II to argue 
that more frequent use of executive clemency recommendations by 
the judiciary will provide the remedy to mandatory injustice. Part III 
then argues that judicial contribution to clemency will counteract at 
least some of clemency’s current stigma and will play a role in its 
revitalization. As part of this revitalization, judicial recommendation 
will also deemphasize political considerations and will refocus the 
decision to grant clemency on the particular facts of a defendant’s 
case. 
Finally, Part IV provides eight illustrative criteria for clemency 
recommendation. They are a combination of the characteristics of the 
three modern cases cited above21 in which the sentencing judges 
recommended clemency. Part IV explains how and why each criterion 
might be important, taking into consideration the goals of judicial 
discretion, executive clemency, and the criminal justice system 
overall. 
 
 20. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 21. See supra notes 18–20. 
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I.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE EXISTENCE OF  
MANDATORY INJUSTICE 
The eighteen years from 1987 to 200522 witnessed an increase in 
the number of criminal defendants who received surprisingly harsh 
sentences, especially those who had committed nonviolent, victimless 
crimes. Consider this: Weldon Angelos was arrested for distribution 
of marijuana at age twenty-four without any prior criminal history.23 
Upon Angelos’s refusal of a plea offer, the prosecutor pushed for 
three additional charges for guns found in his possession, even though 
the guns were never used.24 As a result, the judge reluctantly 
sentenced him to sixty-one and a half years,25 making his expected age 
of release from prison eighty-five. 
Consider another case: Kenneth Harvey was condemned to 
spend the rest of his life in prison for possession of crack cocaine at 
age twenty-four.26 Harvey had two prior criminal offenses, both of 
which were nonviolent.27 
And consider yet another example: Byron McDade, a father of 
four young children with two jobs and no criminal history, was 
convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, as well as 
conspiracy to distribute, and was sentenced to twenty-seven years in 
prison after refusing to testify against a friend. His four codefendants, 
all with prior serious drug convictions, pled guilty, testified against 
him, and each received less than seven and a half years.28 
The judges in all three cases lamented the injustice of the 
sentences they were required to impose pursuant to the then-
 
 22. The mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were enacted in 1984. See supra note 6. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission first published a Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual in 
1987, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987), and has published one 
annually since, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009) [hereinafter 2009 
GUIDELINES MANUAL]. Booker, making the Guidelines advisory, was decided in 2005. See 
supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 23. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1230. 
 26. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1377–78 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 27. Id. 
 28. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79, 86 (D.D.C. 2009). McDade was 
sentenced by Judge Friedman on May 29, 2002. Id. at 79. This opinion, ruling on McDade’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, came after an evidentiary hearing on January 15, 2008. 
Id. at 78. 
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mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.29 What could the judiciary do, if 
anything, to correct this “malfunction[]”30 in the system? 
Historically, if a judge found himself bound by law to issue an 
unjust sentence, he would write directly to the president to pray for 
“an act of grace.”31 The exercise of the president’s executive-clemency 
power was a “regular practice.”32 For example, between 1801 and 
1829, of the 596 defendants sentenced in federal court, 148 were 
pardoned.33 Prior to the enactment of the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines in 1987, judges could reduce terms of imprisonment post-
sentencing after a “sober second look,”34 pursuant to Rule 35.35 
Although Rule 35 was still available to judges during the mandatory-
injustice period, it was inapplicable if the “sober second look” took 
them to below either the Guidelines’ sentencing range or the 
statutory minimum.36 
The Supreme Court made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in 
its 2005 Booker decision, holding that “the provision of the federal 
sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . [is] 
incompatible with today’s constitutional holding.”37 Following 
Booker, judges regained discretionary power in sentencing to avoid 
 
 29. See Harvey, 946 F.2d at 1378 (noting that the sentencing judge was “troubled” at being 
required to impose a life sentence); McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (calling the defendant’s 
sentence “disproportionate”); Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (describing the defendant’s 
sentence as “unjust, disproportionate to his offense, demeaning to victims of actual criminal 
violence—but nonetheless constitutional”). 
 30. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261. 
 31. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 37, 61 (2006) (noting that, even in cases in which mandatory sentences applied, judges 
could recommend executive clemency); George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, 
Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 
FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 213 (2004) (describing methods whereby judges would petition the 
President for clemency). 
 32. Lardner & Love, supra note 31, at 220 n.20. 
 33. DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829, at 46–47 (1985). 
 34. Cf. Carol. S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 402 (1995) 
(applying a “sober second look” in the context of capital punishment). 
 35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (“Within 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a 
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”). 
 36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (“The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and 
within the range, [of the Sentencing Guidelines] . . . .”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
367 (1989) (“[Section 3553] makes the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines binding on the 
courts.”). 
 37. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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injustice. The only period, therefore, during which they completely 
lacked authority to correct disproportionate sentences was between 
the enactment of the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and Booker, 
spanning the eighteen years from 1987 to 2005.38 
Unfortunately, this period of mandatory injustice continues to 
manifest its influence. Absent a remedy, Angelos, Harvey, and 
McDade must serve out, in their entireties, sentences that the 
sentencing judges believed were excessive.39 All three sentencing 
judges recognized the gravity of the situation and searched for a 
solution. Judge Paul Cassell, Angelos’s sentencing judge, “believe[d] 
that to sentence Mr. Angelos to prison for the rest of his life is unjust, 
cruel, and even irrational.”40 He further expressed his exasperation 
that the sentence “is also far in excess of the sentence imposed for 
such serious crimes as aircraft hijacking, second degree murder, 
espionage, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape. It exceeds what 
recidivist criminals will likely serve under the federal ‘three strikes’ 
provision.”41 Yet the judge in the end “reluctantly conclude[d] that 
[he had] no choice but to impose the 55 year sentence.”42 Harvey’s 
sentencing judge, Chief Judge Howard Sachs, “was troubled by the 
necessity of imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without release 
on Harvey . . . [because] ‘the prior drug offenses, although felonies, 
were not deemed serious enough to merit imprisonment and appear 
to be only technically within the statutory punishment plan.’”43 
Finally, Judge Paul Friedman, McDade’s sentencing judge, wrote that 
the sentence imposed is “disproportionate” and “[h]ad the Sentencing 
Guidelines been advisory in 2002, or if Booker were retroactive now, 
the Court would vary substantially from the Guideline sentence of 
 
 38. Booker does not apply retroactively to cases that became final before it was decided on 
January 12, 2005. Duncan v. United States, 552 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 890 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2005); Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 144 
(2d Cir. 2005); Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 615–16 (3d Cir. 2005); Varela v. United 
States, 400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2005); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th 
Cir. 2005). 
 39. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 40. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. The fifty-five years are the punishment for three counts of gun possession. 
Angelos’s total sentence includes an additional six and a half years for the drug conviction. Id. at 
1232. 
 43. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Sachs, C.J., from 
the Sentencing Transcript). 
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324 months. This Court, however, is without authority to reduce 
McDade’s sentence at this juncture.”44 
Under these circumstances, in which the judiciary was without 
legal recourse to correct unjust sentences imposed by the then-
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, all three judges resorted to one 
final appeal for the defendants—executive clemency. Judge Cassell 
put forth his recommendation: 
While I must impose the unjust sentence, our system of separated 
powers provides a means of redress. . . . In my mind, this is one of 
those rare cases where the system has malfunctioned. . . . One of the 
purposes of executive clemency is “to afford relief from undue 
harshness.” . . . Given that the President has the exclusive power to 
commute sentences, . . . is it appropriate for me to make a 
commutation recommendation to the President[?] Having carefully 
reviewed the issue, I believe that such a recommendation is entirely 
proper. The President presumably wants the fullest array of 
information regarding cases in which a commutation might be 
appropriate. Moreover, the Executive Branch has indicated that it 
actively solicits the views of sentencing judges on pardon and 
commutation requests.45 
With respect to Harvey, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Chief Judge 
Sachs’s recommendation for executive clemency, stating that “[a]s the 
Supreme Court noted in Harmelin, executive clemency is one of the 
‘flexible techniques’ for modifying sentences. The existence of these 
techniques is one reason for the Supreme Court’s holding that the 
type of sentence imposed in this case does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”46 Similarly, Judge Friedman “urge[d] the President to 
consider executive clemency for McDade and to reduce McDade’s 
sentence.”47 When judges strongly disagree with the sentences they 
are required to impose, the reasons for their disagreement deserve 
attention. 
This Note argues that when sentencing judges or other judges 
reviewing a case believe the sentence imposed on the defendant to be 
overly severe, they should follow the leadership of Judges Cassell, 
Sachs, and Friedman and recommend executive clemency. The next 
Part explores legislative reform and executive clemency without a 
 
 44. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 45. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (footnotes omitted). 
 46. Harvey, 946 F.2d at 1378 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991)). 
 47. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 86. 
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judicial recommendation and concludes that these measures cannot 
adequately correct the problem of mandatory injustice. 
II. UNAVAILABLE REMEDIES: LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND 
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY WITHOUT JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION 
A.  Legislative Reform 
Legislatures are an effective channel for creating lasting changes 
in the law to prevent future injustice on a large scale. It is important 
to have legislative amendments for such a purpose. Legislative action 
is not adequate, however, to correct injustices that have already 
occurred. The reasons are twofold. First, legislative action takes a 
long time, and an inmate may be forced to spend years in prison 
before a legislature acts.48 A more expedient means to restore just 
sentences to specific defendants in a timely manner is required. 
Second, most reforms are not retroactive; indeed, by overturning final 
judgments, retroactive legislation raises constitutional questions.49 
Even if legislative reform eventually materializes, due to its 
 
 48. See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial 
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 858–68 (2008) 
(discussing how shifting political control and the interaction between the legislative and judicial 
branches can lead to legislative inefficiencies); cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation 
Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
1, 14–16 (2009) (“[J]udicial correctives are both undemocratic and inefficient, and . . . our polity 
would be better off with a legislative solution to this legislative process dysfunction.”). 
 49. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (“[S]uch legislation bears 
not on the problem of interbranch review but on the problem of finality of judicial judgments.”); 
id. at 227 (“Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the 
judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not 
declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other 
than what the courts said it was. Finality of a legal judgment is determined by statute, just as 
entitlement to a government benefit is a statutory creation; but that no more deprives the 
former of its constitutional significance for separation-of-powers analysis than it deprives the 
latter of its significance for due process purposes.”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic 
Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1104 
(2010) (“[Unconstitutional] retroactive legislation began and has been continued, because the 
judiciary has thought itself too weak to withstand; too weak, because it has neither the 
patronage nor the prestige necessary to sustain it against the antagonism of the legislature and 
the bar. . . . Instead of that, it pursued a temporizing course till the mischief had become 
intolerable, and till it was compelled . . . to invalidate certain acts of legislation, or rather to 
reverse certain legislative decrees. . . . Yet the legislature attempted to divest it, by a general law 
it is true, but one impinging on particular rights.” (quoting Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489, 
495 (1849))). 
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adverseness to retroactivity,50 defendants already sentenced may be 
left unaided.51 Legislative action has an eye toward the future; a 
retroactive solution, however, is required to solve the problem of 
mandatory injustice. Thus, legislative action alone is insufficient to 
provide remedies for defendants sentenced prior to Booker. A 
flexible instrument like judicially-recommended executive clemency 
could be of tremendous assistance to specific offenders. 
B.  Executive Clemency 
To understand why a judge’s role in recommending executive 
clemency is critical to providing relief to defendants who were 
sentenced unfairly during the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines 
period, it is imperative to understand clemency’s workings and 
benefits, criticisms, and recent trend of disuse. The executive 
clemency power is firmly rooted in the U.S. Constitution: “[The 
President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.”52 The Founders adapted the clemency power from the 
English Crown’s power to grant pardons at its complete discretion.53  
 
 50. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 93 (6th 
ed. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has seldom had to consider how much res judicata effect is 
necessary.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 693 (2004) (“[R]etroactive 
statutes may upset settled expectations.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) 
(“[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and 
embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new 
rules are announced.”); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (“[T]he choice between 
retroactivity and nonretroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee 
involved.”). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 53. Washington Journal: History of Presidential Pardons (C-SPAN television broadcast 
Dec. 27, 2008); see also Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974) (noting that the Founders 
“were well acquainted with the English Crown authority to alter and reduce punishments as it 
existed in 1787”). Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the clemency power as an executive act of 
grace. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1883). According to Justice Holmes, “[w]hen 
granted[, clemency] is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be 
better served.” Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). The notion of “making 
exceptions . . . for the defendant’s unusually hard circumstances” goes back as far as the laws of 
Hammurabi and classical Rome. Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral 
Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (citing Andrew Brien, 
Mercy Within Legal Justice, 24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 83, 83 n.2 (1998)). 
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Executive clemency is a broad term that includes pardons 
(forgiveness of both crime and punishment), commutations 
(substitution of a milder punishment), and reprieves (postponement 
of punishment).54 Clemency is a presidential prerogative that is not 
subject to legislative control;55 in fact, the president has “wide 
discretion, subject primarily to the constraints of the political process 
and the president’s own personal sense of moral integrity.”56 The 
scope of this authority is extremely broad, covering “every offence 
known to the law.”57 The president is not limited by any statutory bars 
and has the freedom to exercise his power at any time, “either before 
legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after 
conviction and judgment.”58 Furthermore, the president has 
significant leeway to devise the format of the pardon, which can be 
“conditional[] or absolute[].”59 Although the president is not required 
to disclose the reasons for granting clemency—and such reasons vary 
from president to president—a study conducted in 1993 showed that 
47 percent of pardon grants were due to possible innocence, 16 
percent for mental illness or juvenile status, 11 percent for unfair 
trials, 11 percent for disproportionate sentencing, 5 percent for 
rehabilitation, 5 percent due to a request from the Pope, and no 
reason was given in 5 percent of cases.60 
The clemency power of a state governor is found in that 
particular state’s constitution, and it can usually be exercised in “[a]ny 
way [the governor] wants.”61 Approximately thirty-three states have 
appointed their governors as the sole decisionmaker regarding 
clemency, while the rest have some form of clemency board 
appointed by the governors.62 Reasons for using a clemency board 
 
 54. ADAM C. ORTIZ, AM. BAR ASS’N, CLEMENCY AND CONSEQUENCES: STATE 
GOVERNORS AND THE IMPACT OF GRANTING CLEMENCY TO DEATH ROW INMATES 1 (2002). 
 55. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866). 
 56. Morison, supra note 53, at 31. 
 57. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925). 
 60. ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 1. 
 61. Daniel Engber, How Does a Governor Grant Clemency? With a Signed Note, SLATE, 
(Nov. 30, 2005, 6:08 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2131268. The basis of this latitude of 
discretion is rooted in its conceptualization “as an act of grace, a gift freely given.” KATHLEEN 
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8–9 (1989). “Gift-
giving is not something to criticize, analyze, scrutinize, demand, refuse, or justify.” Id. at 9. 
 62. Kavan Peterson, Governors Shy from Clemency Power, STATELINE.ORG (Jan. 30, 
2003), http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&content 
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include “prevent[ing] the governor from being inundated with 
applications, . . . insulat[ing] the governor during the application 
process, and . . . provid[ing] a system that carefully evaluates the 
merits of each application.”63 
In most cases, petitioners for clemency have to follow a set of 
formal procedures before their applications reach the governor or the 
president for possible consideration.64 At the federal level, the 
Department of Justice has a set of rules65 for filing applications, 
investigating the petitioner, dealing with victims, corresponding with 
the public, and recommending a grant or denial to the president.66 
The Pardon Attorney, under the direction of the Deputy Attorney 
General, receives and processes all petitions for clemency.67 If the 
president does not respond within thirty days of the Pardon 
Attorney’s recommendation, it is deemed accepted.68 Notwithstanding 
these formal procedures, the president can grant clemency at will 
without consulting anyone.69 At the state level, regulations vary from 
state to state,70 with some states implementing formal application 
 
Id=15145. Five states have clemency boards that make clemency decisions without the 
governor’s participation: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and Texas. Id. The governor 
grants clemency only on the basis of recommendations by the board in nine states: Arizona, 
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id. In 
three states, Nebraska, Nevada, and Utah, the governor makes decisions with the board. Id. 
 63. Donald Leo Bach, To Forgive, Divine: The Governor’s Pardoning Power, WIS. LAW., 
Feb. 2005, at 12, 62. 
 64. Some cases come to the attention of the president through informal channels. The 
president is not bound by formal executive clemency procedures. See, e.g., Engber, supra note 
61 (“[T]he president isn’t bound by the ‘official’ rules for presidential pardons.”). 
 65. For a detailed description of the procedures and roles of the officers involved, see U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorney’s Manual Standards for Consideration of Clemency 
Petitions, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/petitions.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
 66. Executive Clemency, 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.11 (2009). The authority of the Department of 
Justice in the clemency process was granted by President Grover Cleveland on June 16, 1893. 
GAILLARD HUNT, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND 
FUNCTIONS 130 (1914) (ordering “all warrants of pardons and commutations of sentences . . . be 
prepared and recorded in the Department of Justice”); see also Executive Clemency, 27 Fed. 
Reg. 11,002, 11,002–03 (Oct. 30, 1962) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.11 (1975)) 
(describing the executive clemency process). 
 67. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35–0.36. 
 68. Id. § 1.8(b). 
 69. The language of the Constitution makes no mention of limitations or specific 
procedures to follow, “except in Cases of Impeachment,” in which the president lacks clemency 
power. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1; see also supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 70. For a link to reports that provide a state-by-state description of the clemency process, 
see CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY FOUND., Clemency Policy: State Clemency Resources, 
http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/clemencystates.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
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processes71 and others granting automatic consideration if certain 
criteria are met.72 
1. Support for Executive Clemency.  The executive clemency 
power is a flexible73 “fail safe” devised in recognition of the fallibility 
of the criminal justice system.74 Although the clemency power would 
“be redundant in a perfect administration,”75 imperfect laws will 
continue to give rise to cases with “harsh, unjust, or popularly 
unacceptable results.”76 Due to the complexity of the criminal justice 
system and its inescapable dependence on human interpretation and 
passion, it is vulnerable to error and abuse; executive clemency is a 
backup system to mitigate some of these consequences.77 Such a fail-
safe reflects an acknowledgment of uncertainty and a preference for 
leniency in assigning punishment78 by signaling when the criminal law 
and the Sentencing Guidelines are too harsh, inflexible, or otherwise 
 
 71. Examples include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, and 
West Virginia. Id. (follow appropriate hyperlink). 
 72. Alabama is an example. Id. (follow “Alabama” hyperlink). 
 73. Cf. James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Address at 
the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 
17, 17 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“It is impossible for any general law to 
foresee and provide for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore an inflexible adherence 
to it, in every instance, might frequently be the cause of very great injustice.”). 
 74. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993). 
 75. CESARE BECCARIA, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 111 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies, Virginia Cox & Richard 
Bellamy trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764). 
 76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE 
PROCEDURES 298 (1939). 
 77. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 
281, 284 (1993). Justice Anthony Kennedy endorses executive clemency and urges the American 
Bar Association to “consider a recommendation to reinvigorate the pardon process at the state 
and federal levels.” JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES, resolution 121C (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/rep 
121c.pdf; see also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (“[T]he traditional remedy for claims of innocence 
based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been 
executive clemency.”). 
 78. See Alan M. Dershowitz, What’s Mercy Got to Do with It?, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., 
July 16, 1989, at 7 (“[I]n a world in which errors are inevitable, it is better to err on the side of 
overly lenient, rather than overly harsh, punishment.”). This can be inferred from amendments 
V, VI, and XIV to the U.S. Constitution and the criminal defendant’s presumption of innocence 
until proven guilty. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that 
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal 
law.”). 
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in need of change.79 A corollary consequence to such a fail-safe role is 
the preservation of public confidence in the legal system in spite of its 
occasional tendency to produce arbitrary or disparate results.80 
In circumstances in which relief is warranted, but unavailable 
through other means, “a chief executive’s failure to 
intervene . . . would be a fitting object of moral opprobrium.”81 As 
Justice Iredell said in 1788, “there may be many instances where, 
though a man offends against the letter of the law, yet peculiar 
circumstances in his case may entitle him to mercy.”82 He further 
noted that the president’s “duty [is] to watch over the public safety,” 
which the president can accomplish by exercising the clemency 
power.83 Margaret Love, a former Pardon Attorney, asserts that “the 
president has a duty to pardon, not just where moral desert has been 
established in a particular case, but also as a more general obligation 
of office.”84 Justice Holmes declared that clemency “is part of the 
Constitutional scheme. . . . [I]t is the determination of the ultimate 
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less 
than what the judgment fixed.”85 
This judicial recommendation of clemency is more than a cry for 
mercy for any particular defendant. In fact, “this kind of adjustment 
to a criminal sentence does not necessarily amount to a genuine act of 
mercy.”86 Rather, it is “an equitable ‘bending’ of the rules in order to 
achieve a morally just result, taking into consideration all morally 
relevant facts concerning the defendant and the commission of the 
offense.”87 Alexander Hamilton wrote that “without an easy access to 
 
 79. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 594 
(2001); see also Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential Powers: A 
Reply to Professor Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1383, 1399 (2006). 
 80. Presidential Pardon Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 14 (2001) (statement of Daniel T. Kobil, Professor, Capital 
University Law School). 
 81. Morison, supra note 53, at 23. 
 82. Iredell, supra note 73, at 17.  
 83. Id. at 18. 
 84. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the 
President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1506 (2000). 
 85. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). 
 86. Morison, supra note 53, at 25; see also Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486 (“A pardon in our days is 
not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the 
Constitutional scheme.”). 
 87. Morison, supra note 53, at 25. Legal and moral issues converge when considering 
liability outside the context of pardons as well. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
EC 7–8 (2009) (“[I]t is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to 
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exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a 
countenance too sanguinary and cruel” and clemency is “a mitigation 
of the rigor of the law.”88 A beneficiary of executive clemency urges 
that clemency be used to correct overly severe punishments and to 
give offenders a second chance: 
Today, I could be in federal prison still serving my 24-year sentence. 
Instead, I’ve been raising my now 13-year-old son, graduated from 
college in 2002 and completed a year of law school. . . . [The 
president’s] clemency power should be used with thoughtful 
deliberation. Even so, it should be utilized because clemency is 
sometimes the only possible response to unfair and excessive 
penalties.89 
Executive clemency also plays a role in current death penalty 
debates. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Kennedy v. Louisiana,90 the law 
“draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”91 Justice Scalia wrote in 
another case that the “[r]eversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal 
or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through 
executive clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its 
success.”92 From a historical perspective, “[a]mong the World War II 
traitors, some were sentenced . . . to death, but by the grace of 
executive clemency, none were actually executed.”93 Since 1976, 
clemency has been granted to state death-row inmates 245 times.94 
 
a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.”); June Fabian Witt, Contingency, 
Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, J. TORT L., 2007, at 1, 25–26 (“[B]oth the 
strict liability and negligence principles offer plausible strategies for economically functional 
and morally just approach to liability determinations.”). But see Joshua Wirth, Note, Federal 
Regulation and Legislation in the Wake of the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: A Legal 
Philosophical Analysis of Federal Government Responses to Market Bubbles, 14 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 179, 207–09 (2008) (arguing that just because government regulations in 
response to the meltdown may be morally unjust does not mean the law failed). 
 88. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447–49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 89. Kemba Smith, The Wisdom of Pardons, AM. F. (Dec. 19, 2008, 08:22 AM), 
http://amforumbacklog.blogspot.com/2008/12/wisdom-of-pardons.html. 
 90. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 91. Id. at 2649. 
 92. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 93. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and 
Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1500 
(2009). 
 94. Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2010). Of this total, 172 were granted in Illinois, with the majority of states 
having granted one or two. Id. 
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Moreover, “[c]lemency petitions are a rich resource in the 
investigation of death penalty litigation because they go beyond the 
legal system to include evidence which may have been barred or 
excluded in prior habeas corpus appeals.”95 As Chief Justice Roberts 
stated in response to Senator Russ Feingold’s question about the risk 
of innocent persons receiving death sentences,96 “[T]here is always a 
risk in any enterprise that is a human enterprise like the legal 
system.”97 Thus, in accordance with the Chief Justice’s view, “it is 
absolutely vital that . . . the convicted [be empowered] with the 
procedural tools to fight their convictions.”98 
In abused-child parricide and battered-women cases in which the 
law precludes using abused-child syndrome and battered-women 
syndrome as defenses to premeditated killings, executive clemency 
should be recommended because imprisonment of abused children 
and battered spouses is not in line with criminal justice policy.99 One 
commentator asks, 
What is to be done about the many abused-child parricides currently 
serving lengthy prison sentences? Such long-term incarceration is a 
miscarriage of justice if the convicted parricide was denied a chance 
 
 95. Leona D. Jochnowitz, Public Access to State Clemency Petitions, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 176, 
178 (2008). 
 96. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 365 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 97. Id. (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
 98. Jonathan Aminoff, Something Very Wrong Is Taking Place Tonight: The Diminishing 
Impact of the Actual Innocence Exception on Eligibility for the Death Penalty, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 
86, 136 (2010); see also Saad Gul, The Truth that Dare Not Speak Its Name: The Criminal Justice 
System’s Treatment of Wrongly Convicted Defendants Through the Prism of DNA Exonerations, 
42 CRIM. L. BULL. 687, 690 (2006) (“[F]ederal courts may not entertain habeas petitions on 
grounds of actual innocence, unless the claim is coupled with an independent constitutional 
violation. The[] only recourse may lie in executive clemency petitions.”(footnote omitted)). 
 99. See KATHLEEN M. HEIDE, WHY KIDS KILL PARENTS: CHILD ABUSE AND 
ADOLESCENT HOMICIDE 143 (1992) (“Whenever possible the adolescent parricide offender 
should not be imprisoned; prison psychological services are rarely adequate to deal with the 
depth of his problems.”); Jessica L. Hart & Jeffrey L. Helms, Factors of Parricide: Allowance of 
the Use of Battered Child Syndrome as a Defense, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 671, 680 
(2003) (“[S]kepticism still remains of whether battered child syndrome is a legitimate 
syndrome.”); Rebecca A. Olla, Redefining the Objectively Reasonable Person in Texas: A Case 
for Battered Child Syndrome as Pure Self-Defense for Parricide, 17 TEX. ST. B. SEC. RPT. JUV. L. 
5, 7–8 (2003) (advocating for the use of expert testimony on abused child syndrome in order to 
help judges and juries evaluate the reasonableness of a child’s actions); Susan C. Smith, Abused 
Children Who Kill Abusive Parents: Moving Toward an Appropriate Legal Response, 42 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 141, 165 n.164 (1992) (“Governor Ed Herschler commuted [the child defendant’s] 
prison sentence and ordered her on probation for one year.”). 
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to establish self-defense by offering expert testimony of battered 
child syndrome . . . . Executive clemency for those convicted abused-
child parricides who have already served considerable periods of 
incarceration can solve this problem.100 
In the same vein, battered women who were denied an opportunity to 
assert a defense could be saved by way of clemency. Missouri 
Governor John Ashcroft commuted the sentences of two battered 
women because “the law prohibited juries from hearing about the 
severe abuse and trauma they endured.”101 Rather than leaving them 
to serve out their entire life sentences, the governor restored the 
possibility of parole.102 
John Locke summarizes the benefits of executive clemency 
perhaps most succinctly: 
[T]he Ruler should have a Power, in many Cases, to mitigate the 
severity of the Law, and pardon some Offenders . . . [S]ince in some 
Governments the Lawmaking Power . . . is usually too numerous, 
and so too slow, . . . there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to 
do many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.103 
2. Stigmatization and the Decline of Clemency.  Despite its critical 
role in carrying out justice, the clemency power is often criticized for 
its unreviewable “arbitrary [and] capricious” nature.104 The lack of 
“procedural and substantive constraints”105 makes clemency appear to 
be “[s]hroud[ed] . . . with a certain air of mystery.”106 The critics’ focus 
is thus often not on “the substantive merits of particular cases,” but 
rather on the procedure itself.107 Two practical considerations 
 
 100. Robert Hegadorn, Clemency: Doing Justice to Incarcerated Battered Children, 55 J. MO. 
B. 70, 78 (1999). 
 101. Virginia Young, Sentences Cut for 2 Who Killed Husbands, ST. LOUIS POST–DISPATCH, 
Dec. 17, 1992, at 1A. 
 102. Id. 
 103. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 421–22 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1960) (1690). 
 104. Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 181 
(1988); see also Coleen E. Klasmeier, Note, Towards a New Understanding of Capital Clemency 
and Procedural Due Process, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1507, 1535 (1995) (expressing unease about the 
“potential for arbitrary decisionmaking that inheres in the unfettered clemency power”). 
 105. Hoffstadt, supra note 79, at 597 
 106. Morison, supra note 53, at 28. 
 107. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1350 (2008); Paul J. Haase, Note, “Oh My Darling Clemency”: Existing or 
Possible Limitations on the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287, 
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intensify this air of mystery. First, clemency applicants have legitimate 
interest in protecting their privacy from public scrutiny.108 The 
petition process requires applicants to submit “often sensitive 
biographical information about their character and activities,” and 
the system needs to prevent public disclosure of such information.109 
Second, the lack of public scrutiny allows the president or governors 
“to receive the frank and uninhibited advice of [their] legal and 
political advisers.”110 
Even though the clemency process has largely remained 
unchanged, criticism has grown in recent years. In the past, clemency 
has mostly been regarded favorably, as “a safety valve in a legal 
system that sometimes makes mistakes.”111 For example, between 
1900 and 1989, a substantial number of clemency grants were issued 
from month to month, as opposed to the recent trend of executives 
clustering grants toward the end of their terms.112 The decline in the 
number and consistency of clemency grants began with President 
Richard Nixon.113 This decline is largely attributable to “two relatively 
new influences in the criminal justice system.”114 One gaining 
momentum was “the retributivist theory of ‘just deserts,’”115 which 
increased intolerance of sentencing reduction. The other, which 
quickly caught the public’s attention, was “the politics of the ‘war on 
crime.’”116 The combination of these two movements began to 
decrease the frequency of clemency grants. Similarly, state governors 
 
1298 (2002) (“The main concern that surfaced in light of the Clinton pardons is that President 
Clinton bypassed the normal pardon procedures.”). 
 108. Morison, supra note 53, at 28. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. William Glaberson, States’ Pardons Now Looked at in Starker Light, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2001, at A1; see also supra notes 73–103 and accompanying text. 
 112. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., “Last-Minute” Pardon Scandals: Fact and Fiction 16–18, 22–27 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/pardoncharts 
/Paper2.pdf (presenting graphs that show a fairly even distribution of pardons between each 
month). 
 113. Id. at 25–26. 
 114. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G. 
REP. 5, 7 (2007). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; see also Love, supra note 84, at 1506 (“[T]he duty to pardon is neither grounded in 
nor limited by considerations of law or morality, but is essentially one of politics.”); P.S. 
Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development and Analysis 
(1900–1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 258 (1997) (“[W]hen explaining an 
administration’s use of clemency powers, the partisan identification and political ideology of the 
president cannot be ignored.”). 
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reduced clemency grants for fear of being criticized as being “soft on 
crime and . . . siding against the victims.”117 At the federal level, the 
political and social pressure to be “tough on crime” was exacerbated 
by Attorney General Griffin Bell’s reforms of the Department of 
Justice, which “delegate[d] the clemency advisory responsibility to 
subordinate officials,” including prosecutors.118 In the hands of federal 
prosecutors, clemency recommendations to the president further 
declined.119 
In addition to retributivist theory and political rhetoric, the 
prevalent view that “the system is open to special pleading or outright 
abuse” has added to the decline in grants of clemency.120 Stories like 
those of Carma Storcella,121 Lewis “Scooter” Libby,122 Oklahoma 
Governor J.C. Walton,123 and Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste124 
contribute to the stigma. President George H.W. Bush granted a mere 
seventy-seven clemencies during his four years in office and President 
Bill Clinton only fifty-six during his first term, although he granted 
313 during the last year of his second term.125 President George W. 
Bush granted a total of only 200 during his two terms.126 At the state 
level, taking California as an example, clemency grants drastically 
decreased from 1967 to the present day, with Governor Ronald 
 
 117. Peterson, supra note 62. 
 118. Love, supra note 114, at 7. 
 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. Glaberson, supra note 111 (“The controversy over the Clinton pardons has highlighted 
a concern that clemency orders nationally are often based on inconsistent or unfair policies.”). 
 121. Carma Storcella was pardoned by New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman. The 
media later revealed that she was an “aunt of the director of the casino commission’s division of 
licensing, Christopher Storcella.” Id. 
 122. Love, supra note 114, at 5 (“[T]he Libby commutation in context seemed to confirm 
the popular view of pardon as a personal prerogative of the president, a remnant of tribal 
kingship generally reserved for the well-heeled or well-connected.”); see also Amy 
Goldstein, Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at A1 (“Shortly 
after Libby was convicted in March, three national public opinion polls found that seven in 10 
Americans said they would oppose a pardon of Libby.”). 
 123. Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton was removed from office for selling pardons. 100 
Years of Oklahoma Governors, OKLA. DEP’T OF LIBRARIES, http://www.odl.state.ok.us/oar/ 
governors/Walton.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
 124. Former Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste aroused public contempt for granting 
clemency to sixty-eight individuals at the end of his second term. See generally Daniel T. Kobil, 
Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1991) (discussing the 
political controversy surrounding Celeste’s grants of clemency). 
 125. Ruckman, supra note 112, at 21. 
 126. Bush Grants Clemency to Ex-Border Guards, CBS NEWS.COM (Jan. 19, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/19/politics/main4735156.shtml. 
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Reagan granting 575 from 1967 to 1975, Governor Wilson granting 
thirteen from 1999 to 2003, and Governor Gray Davis granting zero 
from 1999 to 2003.127 
The clemency-to-execution ratio is another way to measure 
clemency rates.128 As of July 2002, the national clemency-to-execution 
ratio is 6.14 percent, or one clemency per sixteen executions.129 Nine 
states have ratios above the national average: Illinois (8.33 percent), 
Florida (11.76 percent), Georgia (17.24 percent), North Carolina 
(23.81 percent), Montana (50 percent), Maryland (66.67 percent), 
Idaho (100 percent), Ohio (200 percent), and New Mexico (500 
percent).130 However, twenty-three states have ratios below that 
national ratio.131 Texas has one of the lowest ratios in the United 
States, with 0.37 percent, or one clemency per 272 executions; 
Oklahoma’s ratio is 2 percent, with one clemency per fifty executions; 
and Missouri’s is 3.51 percent, with one clemency per twenty-eight 
executions.132 Sixteen of the twenty-three states with lower ratios have 
a ratio of 0 percent.133 As such, for the convicted, “pardon is regarded 
as a constitutional anomaly.”134  
 
 127. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. 
ASSEMBLY, 2005-R-0065, RESEARCH REPORT, PARDON STATISTICS FROM OTHER STATES 
(2005), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0065.htm. Although the statistics on California 
are the most thorough, some data from other states suggest that current governors are less likely 
to grant pardons than their recent predecessors. Cf. id. (indicating potential decreases in 
Minnesota, Ohio, and Florida). 
 128. See ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 4 (calculating a ratio of clemencies to executions 
throughout the United States, in Texas, Missouri, and Oklahoma). 
 129. Id. This figure reflects that approximately six inmates were pardoned for every one-
hundred executed. 
 130. AM. BAR ASS’N, CLEMENCY AND CONSEQUENCES: STATE GOVERNORS AND THE 
IMPACT OF GRANTING CLEMENCY TO DEATH ROW INMATES 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/jdpclemeffect02.pdf. 
 131. Id. 
 132. ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 4. 
 133. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 130, at 8. 
 134. Margaret Colgate Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative of Pardoning, LITIGATION, 
Winter 2006, at 25; see also Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George 
Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (2004) 
(“During the 1990s, from one to three death row inmates were granted clemency every year in 
the entire nation—compared to approximately sixty to eighty executions each year. This is a 
dramatic shift from several decades ago, when governors granted clemency in 20% to 25% of 
the death penalty cases they reviewed. In Florida, one of the pillars of the ‘death belt,’ 
governors commuted 23% of death sentences between 1924 and 1966, yet no Florida death 
penalty sentences were commuted in the 1990s.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Despite the public stigma and the fear of granting clemency, as a 
group, presidents and governors seeking reelection have not been 
adversely affected.135 Moreover, whether or not granting clemency 
adversely affects an executive’s political popularity, “it is [the 
executive’s] job to take risks and correct mistakes or unjust outcomes 
in the legal system.”136 Unfortunately, the pervasive view is that the 
executive clemency system today is “inefficient and unreliable, and 
results in very few grants.”137 As a result of the general unwillingness 
to grant clemency, individuals who received disproportionate 
sentences cannot depend exclusively on the president or governors to 
act.138 
III.  A VIABLE SOLUTION: JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION TO  
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 
United States v. Booker ended an eighteen-year period of 
mandatory injustice during which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
forced judges to impose sentences they found overly severe. Many 
individuals who went through the criminal justice system during this 
period are still serving out their sentences. This is similarly true for 
individuals convicted in state courts under mandatory regimes.139 
Unfortunately, neither the legislative nor the executive branch can 
independently provide a sufficient remedy. As discussed, legislative 
reform is slow and adverse to retroactivity, and executive clemency is 
stigmatized and seldom granted. The solution this Note proposes is 
judicial recommendation of executive clemency. Under the current 
 
 135. See ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 2 (“Of the 15 governors who granted clemency since 1993, 
only one was defeated for re-election (James) while three were re-elected or elected to higher 
office (Carnahan re-elected Governor, Allen, Bush, Carnahan elected Senator). Five were 
barred by law from seeking re-election (Wilder, Gilmore, Hunt, Glendening, Keating); two 
retired (Edgar, Batt); and three face re-election in 2002 or 2004 (Huckabee, Easley, Barnes).” 
(footnote and citation omitted)). But see MOORE, supra note 61, at 7 (“President Ford’s pardon 
of Richard Nixon may have cost him reelection; several Governors have been impeached or 
driven from office for abusing their power to pardon.”). 
 136. Peterson, supra note 62 (quoting Margaret Love, former U.S. Pardon Att’y, U.S. 
Department of Justice). 
 137. 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., supra note 9, at 113. 
 138. See Morison, supra note 53, at 11 (“[T]he reluctance of recent presidents to exercise the 
clemency power more generously perhaps can be criticized for displaying a certain lack of moral 
imagination and political courage, particularly given the advent in the last twenty years of strict 
mandatory minimum statutes and rigid sentencing guidelines, together with a burgeoning 
federal prison population.”). 
 139. See supra Part I. 
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regime, judicial involvement in clemency is limited: it generally 
happens only “when a sentencing judge is asked to make a 
recommendation in a particular pardon case.”140 No law, explicitly or 
implicitly, calls for any judicial involvement. But no law forbids such a 
contribution. Thus, under current law and this Note’s proposal, judges 
could recommend clemency at all procedural moments in a case—
including at sentencing, on appeal, upon receiving a habeas petition, 
or during other collateral attacks.141 
Judicial participation in the executive clemency process is 
valuable for three reasons. First, it would provide judges with an 
additional tool to craft suitable sentences. Second, if clemency is 
desirable—which this Note argues that it is—then judicial 
recommendation of clemency would reinvigorate its use. Finally, it 
helps to refocus clemency grants on the circumstances of the 
defendants rather than on arbitrary political influences. 
A.  A Discretionary Tool for Judges to Correct Unjust Sentences 
Enabling judges to appeal to the executive for clemency provides 
the judiciary with a discretionary tool to correct injustice when it is 
bound by law to do the contrary.142 This is most relevant for sentences 
imposed during the eighteen-year period during which the Sentencing 
Guidelines were mandatory. Until Booker made them advisory in 
2005, the Sentencing Guidelines required judges to impose sentences 
within a mandated range, regardless of whether the judges found the 
sentences egregious under the circumstances. Even today, judges 
have no recourse to reduce a term of imprisonment imposed during 
that period. Recall the stories of Angelos, Harvey, and McDade.143 All 
three were sentenced to extremely long prison terms mandated by the 
Sentencing Guidelines—sixty-five and a half years, life, and twenty-
seven years, respectively—even though all three sentencing judges 
 
 140. 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., see supra note 9, at 117. 
 141. Chief Judge Sachs recommended clemency at sentencing, and the decision was 
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378–79 (8th Cir. 1991). 
Judge Friedman appealed to the executive branch after hearing, and rejecting, McDade’s claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on collateral review. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 
2d 77, 86–87 (D.D.C. 2009). Judge Cassell recommended clemency at the sentencing stage of 
Angelos. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1262–63 (D. Utah 2004). 
 142. See generally Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-
Conviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43 
(1998) (reasoning that clemency could either be “an act of mercy” or “an instrument of 
justice”). 
 143. See supra Part I. 
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would have imposed shorter terms. In a last effort to prevent 
injustice, all three judges appealed to the executive branch to grant 
clemency. As a result of the wide latitude given to the president to 
grant clemency, “it is presumably not unjust for a president to grant 
clemency for the same sorts of reasons [as those relied upon by 
judges], especially where a case is beyond the reach of further judicial 
review.”144 The flexibility of the clemency power allows for the 
retroactive modification of unjust sentences that judges were forced 
by the pre-Booker Guidelines to impose.145 
The ongoing effort to pass legislation in Congress that would 
reform sentencing procedures for federal courts confirms the 
necessity of increasing judges’ discretion to guard against 
disproportionate sentencing. Four major legislative proposals 
exemplify Congressional attempts to restore sentencing discretion to 
judges. First, the introduction of the Major Drug Trafficking 
Prosecution Act of 2009146 would eliminate the mandatory minimum 
sentences imposed by the Controlled Substances Act147 and the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act148 and return discretion 
to judges.149 Second, the House of Representatives is considering the 
Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2009, which would broaden 
judicial discretion.150 The bill seeks to abolish the heightened penalties 
and mandatory minimums for drug offenses involving cocaine 
base151—such as crack cocaine—and to dispose of limitations on 
judges’ authority to grant probation and suspended sentencing.152 
Third, a proposed expansion of the safety valve of § 3553(f)153 puts 
additional discretion back in judges’ hands by allowing deviations 
 
 144. Morison, supra note 53, at 25. 
 145. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991) (recommending 
executive clemency to modify a convicted person’s sentence). 
 146. Major Drug Trafficking Prosecution Act, H.R. 1466, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 147. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006). 
 148. Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Id. § 951. 
 149. H.R. 1466 (replacing various provisions reading “which may not be less than [x] years” 
with “for any terms of years”). 
 150. Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act, H.R. 1459, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3245, 111th 
Cong. (2009). Both bills are sponsored by Representative Robert Scott, D-VA. Bill H.R. 1459 
was introduced in the House on March 12, 2009, and bill H.R. 3245 was introduced on July 16, 
2009. 
 151. H.R. 1459; H.R. 3245. 
 152. H.R. 1459. In addition to eliminating the crack–powder cocaine sentencing disparity, 
this bill calls for judicial discretion in other areas of drug sentencing. Id. 
 153. The safety valve allows judges to deviate below mandatory minimum sentences. 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006). 
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below mandatory sentences.154 Judges have applied the law as it stands 
to adjust the sentences of 25 percent of all drug offenders to below 
mandatory minimums.155 The proposal would broaden the reach of 
the safety valve to “offenders whose criminal history points overstate 
their actual risk of recidivism”156 and to nondrug offenders subject to 
mandatory minimums.157 Finally, the Criminal Justice Transition 
Coalition proposes a greater emphasis on sentencing alternatives to 
incarceration, such as probation and community service.158 These 
proposals would entrust judges with greater discretion in sentencing, 
allowing them to carefully “craft sentences that more accurately 
punish offenders based on the severity of their offense, their 
culpability, and their criminal history.”159 The increased use of judicial 
recommendation of executive clemency proposed by this Note 
complements these current reforms.  
B.  Revitalization of Executive Clemency Grants 
Increasing the use of the judicial power to recommend clemency 
would contribute to the revitalization of the clemency process. As 
discussed in Part II.B, grants of clemency have declined drastically in 
recent history due to the stigma associated with the clemency power. 
The popular view is that the clemency process is “cumbersome, 
arbitrary, and capricious.”160 The decline in the use of the clemency 
power is detrimental to the criminal justice system because clemency 
provides the final “means of preventing manifest injustice caused by 
the inherent inflexibility of the criminal law and the imperfections of 
its human application.”161 
 
 154. 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., supra note 9, at 38. This proposal will 
become moot if either bill H.R. 1459, H.R. 1466, or H.R. 3245 are enacted into law. Each bill 
would eliminate mandatory minimums, thereby rendering safety valves unnecessary. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (“Due to the peculiarities of the sentencing guidelines’ criminal history provisions, 
people who have been convicted of more than one very minor offense, such as driving on a 
suspended license or passing a bad check, can be considered to have too much criminal 
background to qualify for the safety valve.”). 
 157. Id. at 39, 41 (noting that crimes including gun offenses, sex crimes, and identity fraud 
became subject to mandatory minimums without a safety valve). 
 158. Id. at 47–50. 
 159. Id. at 38. 
 160. Former Inmate Believes in the Power of Pardons (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98399545; see also supra  
Part I. 
 161. Morison, supra note 53, at 26–27. 
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Judicial recommendation of clemency is beneficial to both the 
clemency process itself and its rejuvenation. Judicial recommendation 
is valuable to the clemency process because the president 
“presumably wants the fullest array of information regarding cases in 
which a commutation might be appropriate.”162 And judicial 
recommendation helps revitalize clemency by adding legitimacy to 
the executive’s decision to grant clemency. This happens on two 
levels. First, by responding to judicial requests in some cases, an 
executive receives the imprimatur of the courts and is thus able to 
provide legal reasons for its decisions.163 Second, judicial 
recommendation may serve the system of checks and balances by 
giving the judiciary the power to prod the executive to act when the 
legislature has mandated excessively harsh sentencing requirements.164 
Helping to increase clemency grants by way of judicial 
recommendation is not only viable and effective but also efficient. 
The judges in Angelos, Harvey, and McDade recommended clemency 
in their written opinions and requested that their opinions be sent to 
the Office of the Pardon Attorney.165 Hence, judges would not need 
additional resources to take this step: nothing needs to be done other 
than writing the recommendation in the opinion and mailing it to the 
Department of Justice or the appropriate state office. 
C.  Improvement of Equity in Clemency Grants 
Judicial contribution to the clemency recommendation process 
refocuses clemency grants on the particular defendant in a particular 
case to increase the extent to which similarly situated defendants are 
treated the same way. Typically, clemency grants are based on 
“[p]olitical influences . . . includ[ing] . . . such factors as public 
opinion, the social status of a petitioner and his/her supporters, 
specific foreign policy concerns or the outbreak of war.”166 Other 
commentators have referred to “the lawyers’ political affiliations and 
ambitions, the status of the victim’s family, the proximity to a 
 
 162. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1261 (D. Utah 2004). 
 163. Murphy, supra note 104, at 162, 181. 
 164. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last 
Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185, 217 (2003) (“[A]n unlimited power to make exceptions to the 
law depends for its legitimacy upon a process that at least appears to limit it.”). 
 165. For the requests in each opinion, see United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378–79 
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86–87 (D.D.C. 2009); Angelos, 345 
F. Supp. 2d at 1230–31. 
 166. Ruckman, supra note 116, at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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gubernatorial election, and the perception that a governor is too soft 
on crime.”167 Absent from these common considerations is a factor of 
great import—the specific factual background of the defendant’s case. 
The individual most familiar with the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case is the sentencing judge, whose recommendation may 
help reduce inconsistent or arbitrary clemency grants. This is largely 
because judges are equipped with the knowledge to decide not only 
on the severity of the crime, but also on the moral blameworthiness of 
a particular offender.168 For example, “a person who compassionately 
kills his terminally ill spouse to relieve her physical suffering ought to 
be judged less harshly than someone who kills his spouse in order to 
collect the proceeds of an insurance policy, even though both have 
committed the crime of homicide.”169 Input by sentencing judges on 
the use of clemency to reduce sentences to an appropriate level 
provides judges with a critical tool to correct injustice and breathe life 
back into clemency. 
IV.  GUIDELINES FOR CLEMENCY RECOMMENDATION 
 BY THE JUDICIARY 
Judicial recommendation of executive clemency advances the 
achievement of “a morally just result”170 by (1) providing judges with 
a discretionary tool to correct harsh punishments; (2) revitalizing the 
exercise of clemency on both the federal and state levels; and (3) 
improving equitability in clemency grants by focusing sentence 
modification via clemency on the defendant and the facts of the case 
rather than on political influences. Having concluded that judicial 
participation in executive clemency is valuable, this Part discusses 
some of the relevant factors to consider when evaluating a case for 
clemency recommendation.  
 
 167. Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 371 
(2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency 
in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 349, 353–55 (2003) (discussing the 
reasons judges have issued clemency for capital cases, including “to achieve justice or bestow 
mercy” and “to prevent the loss of convictions and to conserve judicial resources”); Richard A. 
Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 87–88 (2003) (“But clemency is, at bottom, a 
political crapshoot that forces the innocent and guilty alike to rely on popularly elected 
politicians, or their political appointees, to ensure that ultimate justice is done.”). 
 168. See Michael Davis, Sentencing: Must Justice Be Even-Handed?, 1 LAW & PHIL. 77, 86 
(1982) (discussing how the circumstances of the crime may affect sentencing). 
 169. Morison, supra note 53, at 20–21. 
 170. Id. at 25. 
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A.  Miscarriage of Justice 
When the justice system mandates overly severe penalties in 
individual cases that cannot be corrected by other measures, 
executive clemency is an effective way to correct the injustice. For 
example, in Angelos, Judge Cassell reluctantly found that, although 
the system malfunctioned, he had no recourse at the judicial level to 
reduce a sentence that was “so grossly disproportionate to the 
crime.”171 During the sentencing stage, Judge Cassell rigorously 
evaluated all possible means of reducing Angelos’s unjust sentence, 
including an equal-protection challenge and a claim that the sentence 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, but he concluded that they were of no use in this case.172 
He found the sentence mandated by the gun statute, as applied to 
Angelos, “cruel, unjust, and even irrational.”173 In Harvey, Chief 
Judge Sachs found Harvey’s offense “not . . . serious enough to merit 
imprisonment.”174 In McDade, even though Judge Friedman found the 
sentence imposed on McDade “disproportionate,”175 the defendant 
had no more recourse after losing his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
collateral claim. In these instances where the sentencing judges 
perceive a miscarriage of justice, judicial recommendation of 
executive clemency is highly valuable for ensuring proportionality in 
the sentence imposed. 
B.  The Sentence Imposed Is Long 
 For administrative efficiency, only cases with long sentences 
should be considered for clemency recommendation. This is not to 
say that defendants who received shorter sentences are not as worthy, 
but the clemency power should be exercised only when a substantial 
portion of the defendant’s life will be spent in prison.  
It is difficult to provide an absolute number, but McDade was 
sentenced to twenty-seven years, Angelos to sixty-one and a half 
years, and Harvey to life. Such long sentences should, at a minimum, 
provoke a “sober second look.”176 
 
 171. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004). 
 172. Id. at 1235–60. 
 173. Id. at 1230. 
 174. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Sachs, C.J., from 
the Sentencing Transcript). 
 175. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 176. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 402. 
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C.  The Underlying Crime Is Nonviolent 
Arguably, violent crimes pose greater danger to society at large 
than nonviolent ones. Under each justification for criminal 
punishment—retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation177—this seems to hold true. From a retributivist 
perspective, society deems violent criminals more deserving of 
punishment than nonviolent criminals due to the more serious 
consequences that attend violent crimes. An example of how this 
concern affects sentencing is the enactment of § 3553(f), which allows 
for direct sentencing “point” reductions178 for nonviolent criminals in 
the Sentencing Guidelines’ offense-level calculation.179 Turning to the 
other justifications, the safety of other members of society makes the 
incapacitation and deterrence of violent criminals more urgent than 
the incarceration of nonviolent criminals. And although it is arguable 
whether society’s interest in rehabilitating a criminal changes with the 
degree of violence involved, rehabilitation can be considered here in 
terms of the extent to which it is possible and successful. Prison is not 
an ideal place for the rehabilitation of offenders due to the violence 
and generally tense atmosphere prevalent there.180 Nonviolent 
 
 177. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & BUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 21 (6th ed. 2008). 
 178.  McDade exemplifies how the sentencing “point” system works:  
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Base Offense Level for 150 kilograms 
or more of cocaine is 38. Had Mr. McDade pled guilty, he would have received a 
three level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to Section 
3E1. 1 of the Guidelines, to Offense Level 35. As part of the plea agreement, Mr. 
McDade’s managerial role in the conspiracy, a three level upward adjustment under 
Section 3B1.1, likely would have been negotiated away, leaving the Offense Level at 
35. At Criminal History Category I, Mr. McDade’s sentence would have been 
between 168 and 210 months. The Court would have imposed a sentence of 168 
months. 
McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 86. 
 179. The statute, in relevant part, states that 
the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United 
States Sentencing Commission . . . without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, 
if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the 
opportunity to make a recommendation, that . . . the defendant did not use violence 
or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or 
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) (2006). 
 180. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1994) (“[T]he penitentiary had a violent 
environment and a history of inmate assaults . . . and petitioner . . . would be particularly 
vulnerable to sexual attack.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (“Even a partial 
survey of the statistics on violent crime in our Nation’s prisons illustrates the magnitude of the 
problem. During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners murdered by 
fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by 
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criminals should not be forced to stay in such an environment for an 
excessively lengthy period.181 Long prison terms for nonviolent 
offenders may retard or prevent rehabilitation and may even 
engender violent tendencies.182 In Angelos, Harvey, and McDade, the 
sentencing judges considered the nonviolent nature of the defendants’ 
crimes in recommending clemency—Angelos: possession of marijuana 
and possession, but not use, of weapons; Harvey: possession of crack 
cocaine; and McDade: cocaine distribution. Other judges should 
follow Judges Cassell, Sachs, and Friedman and consider the 
nonviolent nature of the offense as a criterion for recommending 
clemency. 
D.  The Punishment Is Disproportionate to the Sentences  
Received by Codefendants 
For the fair execution of criminal punishment, codefendants who 
were similarly involved in the crime should be sentenced to similar 
terms. For example, Judge Friedman noted in McDade, 
 
prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances were reported in these 
facilities for the same time frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these institutions. 
Additionally, informal statistics from the United States Bureau of Prisons show that in the 
federal system during 1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other 
inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system in 
1981 and 1982 over 750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate assaults on prison 
personnel.” (citations omitted)); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 
(1977) (“Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and 
prison officials or staff, contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and 
conflagration.” (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561–62 (1974)). 
 181. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-1667, at 17 (1966) (“The net effect is to confine eligibility for 
the benefits of the legislation to addicts accused of nonviolent crimes who show good prospects 
for rehabilitation, while retaining strict criminal punishment for dangerous or hardened 
offenders, narcotics pushers, and persons with a history of failure to respond to treatment.”); 
Lauren M. Cutler, Note, Arizona’s Drug Sentencing Statute: Is Rehabilitation a Better Approach 
to the “War on Drugs”?, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 397, 419 (2009) 
(“[R]esearch conducted by experts in recent years has demonstrated that rehabilitation offers a 
more comprehensive, long-term solution to nonviolent criminals . . . .”); Jing Tsang, Note, 
California’s Drug Reform Policies: Past, Present, Future, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 887, 889 (2009) 
(“Due to the increasing number of nonviolent criminals in its prison system, California has 
made it a goal to reduce the number of nonviolent drug offenders in its prisons. It hopes to 
reduce the overpopulated system by offering rehabilitation programs in lieu of 
incarceration . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 182. S. REP. NO. 89-1667, at 17; Cutler, supra note 181, at 419; Tsang, supra note 181, at 889; 
see also Note, Manufacturing Social Violence: The Prison Paradox & Future Escapes, 11 
BERKLEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 84, 108 (2009) (“The prison is not a place where prisoners 
rehabilitate. In fact, it seems that at a place like Terminal Island which is a middle security 
Federal Prison, many prisoners come in for nonviolent crimes and soon find their personalities 
shifting towards violence and survival.” (quoting an inmate)). 
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While each of [the co-defendants] pled guilty and provided 
substantial assistance to the government by testifying against Mr. 
McDade (and some provided assistance in other ways), this sentence 
is disproportionate. Indeed, had Mr. McDade not exercised his 
constitutional right to a jury trial and instead pled guilty, the likely 
sentence under even a mandatory Guideline regime would have 
been approximately 168 months, approximately half the sentence 
the Court was required to impose after Mr. McDade was found 
guilty at trial.183 
In the interest of equity, substantial deviations of sentencing from 
that imposed on codefendants should be a factor in considering 
sentence reduction via executive clemency. 
E.  The Level of Punishment Is Inconsistent with the Nature of  
the Offense 
“Where two offences are in conjunction, the greater offence 
ought to be subjected to severer punishment, in order that the 
delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser.”184 This is the third 
rule of thumb articulated in Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of Legislation. 
Although the Sentencing Guidelines and various other statutes 
expend great efforts to adhere to this principle, these attempts 
sometimes fail. One such failure is the recidivist enhancement for gun 
possession under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), under which Angelos was 
convicted.185 The enhancement was enacted with the purpose of 
punishing offenders who repeatedly used weapons in subsequent 
crimes after serving prior convictions. The law was also used, 
however, to enhance the punishment of first-time offenders.186 The 
Criminal Justice Transition Coalition proposed an amendment to the 
 
 183. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 184. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard 
Hildreth trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1931) (1802) (emphasis omitted). 
 185. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1239–43 (D. Utah 2004) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000)). 
 186. See 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (“For example, 
a defendant who, over the course of three days, carried a gun while making three drug sales 
(prosecuted in a single indictment resulting in three separate convictions) can be sentenced to a 
minimum sentence of 55 years for the gun charges, plus whatever other sentences result from 
the underlying conviction. This defendant, if convicted in one trial of three instances of carrying 
a gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense, will be sentenced to (1) whatever sentence the 
drug trafficking conviction carries; (2) a five-year mandatory minimum sentence consecutive to 
the drug sentence, and (3) two 25-year mandatory minimum sentences consecutive to the drug 
sentence, consecutive to the five-year mandatory minimum and consecutive to each other.”). 
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law to clarify that offenders subject to this enhancement must be true 
recidivists, to avoid sentencing “a twenty-four-year-old first 
offender . . . to a mandatory consecutive term of 55 years based on his 
three convictions in the same trial for simply possessing a firearm in 
connection with small marijuana deals.”187 When judges find a 
punishment that is technically required but clearly incompatible with 
the purpose of the law, they should recommend clemency to the 
executive. 
F.  Clean or Low-Level Criminal History 
Society has less sympathy for repeat offenders than for first-time 
offenders for many reasons. First, because “to err is human,” society 
gives some leeway before harshly punishing individuals for their 
offenses. Upon repeated warnings, however, the system draws a line 
and severely punishes repeat offenders, as is reflected in California’s 
three-strikes law188 and the gun statute implicated in Angelos.189 
Second, society is more willing to give first-time offenders a second 
chance, especially for nonviolent crimes.190 This willingness is 
intertwined with the rehabilitative goal of the justice system and 
reflects a belief that there is a greater likelihood of rehabilitation and 
reentry back into society for first-time offenders. The consideration of 
criminal history in sentencing calculations under the Sentencing 
Guidelines illustrates this view,191 as does the consideration of 
criminal-history level in deciding between sentences of incarceration 
and probation.192 Finally, punishing first-time offenders less severely 
 
 187. Id. at 45. 
 188. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 2010) (“It is the intent of the Legislature . . . to 
ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have 
been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.”). 
 189. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
359, 393 (2005) (“Studies have shown, for example, that public opinion tends to be much more 
punitive with regard to violent than nonviolent crimes.” (citing Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. 
Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME 
& JUST. 1, 59 (2000))). 
 191. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines assign criminal-history levels based on the number 
of offenses a defendant has committed prior to the offense being sentenced. The categories 
range from I to VI, which puts defendants into different zones of potential incarceration lengths. 
2009 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 22, at § 5A, sentencing tbl. 
 192. Pablo Martinez & Joycelyn M. Pollock, Impact of Type of Attorney on Sentencing, 44 
CRIM. L. BULL. 652, 653 (2008) (“Research on sentencing has examined what factors go into the 
decision to incarcerate versus giving the offender a ‘second chance’ with a community 
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than recidivists is also in line with the deterrence and incapacitation 
justifications. Arguably, recidivists require greater impediments to 
deter and incapacitate because their repeated behavior shows a lack 
of susceptibility to deterrence. Thus, judges should take an offender’s 
criminal history into consideration when deciding whether to 
recommend clemency. 
G.  Immaturity of Judgment 
Though young offenders not within the age range of juveniles 
should by no means be treated more leniently for their crimes, their 
youth should be a factor in recommending clemency when some or 
many of the other factors described are present. Both Harvey and 
Angelos were twenty-four years old when convicted and sentenced to 
life193 and sixty-one and a half years in prison,194 respectively. Harvey 
had several minor drug offenses prior to his conviction and Angelos 
had a clean criminal history.195 Sixty years is a long time for 
punishment and provides bountiful room for rehabilitation, especially 
for young people.196 Under these circumstances, judges should take 
defendants’ immaturity of judgment into consideration. 
H.  Young Dependents and Future-Generation Consequences 
The existing criminal justice system rarely takes familial 
situations into account. Even though the Sentencing Guidelines 
provide a downward departure for familial situations, it is rarely 
 
supervision sentence. Obvious factors that have been examined include: crime of conviction, 
criminal history, race, and gender.”). 
 193. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 194. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2004). 
 195. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 196. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 288 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]mportant 
protections that the law has traditionally provided to youthful offenders because of 
their . . . greater potential for rehabilitation [should be observed].”); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 
U.S. 393, 398 (1987) (“The only mitigating circumstance [against the death penalty the 
sentencing judge] found was petitioner’s youth.”); Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of 
Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 91 (2009) (“Crimes 
committed by still-developing young people, these scholars urge, are less blameworthy than 
equivalent acts by adults; further, youths’ developmental plasticity makes them more likely to 
stop offending—if, that is, we provide them with conditions conducive to rehabilitation.” (citing 
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 13–16 
(2008))). 
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applied.197 On the one hand, it is not difficult to comprehend why 
familial conditions rarely warrant a departure; most defendants have 
relatives whose lives would be affected by the defendants’ 
incarceration. Offenders with young, dependent children, however, 
deserve closer examination. Take McDade, for example. He had four 
children, all below the age of ten when he was incarcerated. He held 
two jobs to support his family and was actively involved with the 
children’s school and his community church. The court put McDade 
in prison for twenty-seven years.198 The criminal justice system does 
not take into account the effects of its laws on future generations of 
children. Society does not gain much by incarcerating a child’s 
nonviolent, first-time-offender father for the duration of the child’s 
youth; rather, society may suffer a significant loss by creating 
unproductive new members, or even new criminal offenders.199 Judges 
could effectively remedy the lack of next-generation consideration in 
the criminal justice system by considering the potential impact on the 
convict’s children when deciding whether to recommend clemency. 
 
 
 197. 2009 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 22, at § 5H1.6 (“[F]amily ties and 
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be 
warranted.” (emphasis added)). 
 198. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 199. See, e.g., Mogens Nygaard Christoffersen, Brian Francis & Keith Soothill, An 
Upbringing to Violence? Identifying the Likelihood of Violent Crime Among the 1966 Birth 
Cohort in Denmark, 14 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 367, 367 (2003) (“First-time 
convicted offenders have an increased risk of coming from seriously disadvantaged 
families . . . .”); DeAnna Pratt Swearingen, Comment, Innocent Until Arrested?: Deliberate 
Indifference Toward Detainee’s Due-Process Rights, 62 ARK. L. REV. 101, 103 (2009) (“[E]arly 
American scholars attributed deviant behavior to the poor upbringing of the offender and the 
vices of the community.”); Crime: What The Country Really Thinks: Children’s Upbringing Seen 
as Key to a Law-Abiding Society, INDEPENDENT (London), May 7, 1994, at 3 (“Raising the 
moral climate started off as the most outstandingly popular tactic for tackling crime: teaching 
children the difference between right from wrong was identified by more than 90 per cent of 
people as one of the most effective ways of tackling crime, parents spending more time with 
their children by 85 per cent and firmer discipline in schools by 83 per cent.”). Although the 
sources cited above also speak to this point, the lyrics of a popular song may paint a clearer 
picture: 
Oh, there ain’t no rest for the wicked / Money don’t grow on trees / I got bills to pay / 
I got mouths to feed / There ain’t nothing in this world for free. / I know I can't slow 
down / I can’t hold back / Though you know, I wish I could / No there ain’t no rest for 
the wicked / Until we close our eyes for good. 
CAGE THE ELEPHANT, AIN’T NO REST FOR THE WICKED (Jive Records 2009) (quoting a 
prostitute, a street robber, and an embezzler). 
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CONCLUSION 
Even though the Sentencing Guidelines were enacted with the 
goal of mitigating “[d]isparity in sentencing” and establishing 
“certainty of punishment,”200 they required sentences that judges 
deemed unjust.201 Largely due to its flexibility, executive clemency is 
an efficient method to cure individual injustices caused by the 
malfunctioning of mandatory sentencing schemes. Judicial 
recommendation of executive clemency gives judges the discretion to 
call specific cases to the attention of the executive branch for 
clemency consideration. 
That said, judicial recommendation of clemency is not limited to 
correcting sentences imposed during the mandatory-injustice period. 
Due to sentencing judges’ familiarity with their cases and the 
flexibility of executive clemency, judicial recommendation of 
executive clemency could play a significant role in revitalizing and 
reinvigorating clemency grants at both the federal and state levels.202 
Given the usefulness of executive clemency as a last resort for justice, 
its current unpopularity and declining use represents a loss to the 
criminal justice system. Judicial approval of clemency grants can help 
revive clemency by providing an additional level of legitimacy. 
Furthermore, judicial recommendation of clemency improves 
equitability in clemency grants by focusing sentence modifications on 
the defendant and the facts of the case rather than on political 
influences. Thus, a more frequent use of clemency recommendations 
by the judiciary can play a significant role in correcting injustice and 
avoiding disproportionate sentences. 
 
 200. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION 1 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSC_overview_200906.pdf. 
 201. See supra Part I. 
 202. See supra notes 73–89 and accompanying text. 
